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Abstract 
Over the last few years, a proliferation of attempts to define, understand and fight the spread                
of problematic information in contemporary media ecosystems emerged. Most of these           
attempts focus on false content and/or bad actors detection. In this paper, we argue for a                
wider ecological focus. Using the frame of ​media manipulation and a revised version of the               
“coordinated inauthentic behavior” original definition, the paper presents a study based on an             
unprecedented combination of Facebook data, accessed through the CrowdTangle API, and           
two datasets of Italian political news stories published in the run-up to the 2018 Italian               
general election and 2019 European election. By focusing on actors’ collective behavior, we             
identified several networks of pages, groups, and verified public profiles (“entities”), that            
shared the same political news articles on Facebook within a very short period of time. Some                
entities in our networks were openly political, while others, despite sharing political content             
too, deceptively presented themselves as entertainment venues. The proportion of inauthentic           
entities in a network affects the wideness of the range of news media sources they shared,                
thus pointing to different strategies and possible motivations. The paper has both theoretical             
and empirical implications: it frames the concept of “coordinated inauthentic behavior” in            
existing literature, introduces a method to detect coordinated link sharing behavior and points             
out different strategies and methods employed by networks of actors willing to manipulate             
the media and public opinion. 
 
Keywords​: political news, authenticity, coordinated inauthentic behavior, Facebook, 
CrowdTangle, elections, Italy  
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Introduction 
Citizens’ exposure to online disinformation has become a major concern all over the world              
for a while now. The fear that malicious actors could sow the seeds of discord and distrust                 
among digitally connected citizens, feeding polarization and stirring up insurmountable          
divisions so as to undermine the democratic process, has filled the unceasing flow of reports               
and news articles that have been published on the topic. Especially since 2016, when Brexit               
referendum in UK and US Presidential elections marked a turning point in the history of the                
relations between the Internet, social media, public opinion, and politics. From that moment             
on, it has become clear that the antagonist online participatory practices of sharing,             
collaborating and organizing collective actions ​(Jenkins, 2006; Shirky, 2008)​, which used to            
be considered the prerogative of democratizing forces fighting established powers, could be            
just as effective to support the spread of extremisms, hate speech, violence and false news               
(Marwick & Lewis, 2017)​. 
Since the stakes are so high, researchers, governments and supranational institutions           
have clearly put a lot of effort into clarifying disinformation-related concepts, unravelling the             
complex, intertwined dimensions of the phenomenon, studying its empirical manifestations          
and trying to find solutions. Unfortunately, despite all efforts, stopping disinformation has            
proved harder than expected. A serious obstacle in fighting the problem effectively has             
certainly been the difficulty to mark a clear boundary between problematic and            
non-problematic information.  
More recently, a new approach has proposed to circumvent this definitional obstacle by             
shifting the focus from content to dynamics of information spreading within online networks.             
Online content, indeed, benefits from a multitude of actors that amplify its reach, with a               
magnitude proportional to the popularity of online actors, the budget they can invest in social               
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media ads, and the activation of platform algorithms that prioritize better-performing images,            
videos, and posts, making popular content spread faster. It follows that “bad actors” may              
attempt to coordinate their efforts to get the initial plug which, once detected by the               
algorithm, may ignite the propagation machine and even attract the attention of mainstream             
media ​(Phillips, 2018) on the content they spread for profit or propaganda. Although this is               
not a new phenomenon ​(boyd, 2017)​, during the last few years we observed similar practices               
applied with the aim of enhancing the spread of political news stories. 
Despite this new approach seems promising and also a leading and socially impactful             
social media company as Facebook currently employs it to fight disinformation by targeting             
what it has called “coordinated inauthentic behavior” ​(Gleicher, 2018)​, there are still few             
attempts to substantiate it through independent empirical studies. To start to fill this gap, the               
research we are going to present framed the ill-defined concept of coordinated inauthentic             
behavior in the existing scientific literature and tested the related “action-based” approach to             
disinformation detection through an unprecedented combination of Facebook data and two           
datasets of political news stories shared on Facebook in the six months before the 2018               
general election and 2019 European election in Italy.  
A key contribution of this work is the introduction of a method for identifying networks               
of pages and groups that coordinately shared the same news items on Facebook, a              
phenomenon we call “coordinated link sharing behavior”. By employing this method – which             
is easily applicable to other national and political contexts – we were able to test whether the                 
coordinated social media activity was associated with the spread of problematic information,            
that is, whether shifting the focus from online content to patterns of actions represents a               
fruitful approach to problematic information detection. 
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The paper is structured as follows: the first section frames the main challenges of              
problematic information detection, media manipulation and “coordinated inauthentic        
behavior” in the existing scientific literature. Then, the research questions are formulated and             
the datasets and methods used to answer them are detailed. Afterwards, the limitations of the               
research are enucleated and its results discussed to draw general conclusions and provide             
hints for future research. 
 
Literature review and Research Questions 
The widely recognized risks of misinformed citizens for healthy democracies brought a            
cohort of scholars to tackle this issue from a range of different perspectives. The deeply and                
still undergoing transformations of contemporary media ecologies led to a renewed interest in             
this topic resulting in a rapidly growing body of interdisciplinary scholarly works published             
during the last few years. Rather than attempting to provide a systematic review of these               
studies, the following paragraphs highlight the essential literature that frames our approach,            
clarify the terminology used and lead to our research questions. 
The first paragraph highlights the results and limits of content-based and actor-based            
approaches to detect bad information and malicious actors. The second describes the media             
manipulation frame and the concepts of amplification and problematic information. The third            
and the fourth analyze the concept of “coordinated inauthentic behavior” and pinpoint its             
potential roots in the existing literature.  
Challenges of content-based and actor-based problematic information detection 
While unanimously recognizing misinformation as detrimental for healthy democracies, the          
existing literature is fragmented when it comes to defining the object of study. The lack of a                 
shared, consistent and operationalizable definitions undermines both the attempts to estimate           
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its prevalence over legitimate information ​(Lazer et al., 2018) and measure the impact of              
misinformation on citizens’ opinions or behaviour ​(Weeks & Gil de Zúñiga, 2019)​. While the              
issue of definition is widely recognized by scholars, the prevalent effect of the countless              
attempts to formally address it by way of new definitions and taxonomies ​(Molina, Sundar,              
Le, & Lee, 2019; Silverman, 2017; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017) seems to have mostly              
dragged the scientific community deeper into the epistemological rabbit hole of “fake news”             
(Caplan, Hanson, & Donovan, 2018; HLEG EU Commission, 2018)​. To avoid falling in this              
trap, throughout this article we adopt the umbrella terminology of problematic information            
(Jack, 2017) to reference the whole spectrum of contents that range from deliberately or              
mistakenly false news to propaganda, gaslighting and satire. 
Even when avoiding to differentiate the phenomenon based on the motivations of who             
creates and distributes problematic information, the simple basic choice of flagging the            
content as true or false is not always possible or advisable ​(Giglietto, Iannelli, Valeriani, &               
Rossi, 2019; Marwick, 2018)​. On the one hand, drawing such a clear distinction requires a               
significant amount of time, skills and resources for each content. On the other hand, due to                
the lack of commonly accepted definitions, making such calls is a great responsibility that              
deeply affects the outcomes of the study. For all these reasons, a large body of studies tend to                  
delegate this crucial process to established external bodies (e.g. list of false content flagged              
by fact-checkers) ​(Allcott, Gentzkow, & Yu, 2019; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Guess, Nagler,             
& Tucker, 2019) or adopting narrow definitions ​(Khan, Khondaker, Iqbal, & Afroz, 2019) or              
features based detections ​(Reis, Correia, Murai, Veloso, & Benevenuto, 2019) that are strict             
or vague enough to be operationalized in an algorithm (in a certain sense another form of                
delegation). 
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Both approaches come however with their own well-known limits. Due to the amount of              
work required to fact-check a single content, the quota of content flagged as false tends to be                 
a small fraction of the overall false content circulating online. The algorithmic approach has              
also its shortcomings due to the need for narrowing down the definition enough to make it                
possible to operationalize the concept and minimize false positives. In both cases, there is a               
high risk of underestimating the real prevalence of existing false content . 1
Along the same line of delegations, it is possible to shift the attention from single content                
to actors. The idea is that a user/page/account/news outlet that repeatedly published or shared              
content that was flagged as false, can be deemed as problematic as a whole. This idea, often                 
based on “black lists” provided by professional fact-checkers, streamline the whole process            
and allow for raw but automatic estimates of the prevalence of content created by problematic               
actors. While widely used, this approach carry some risks of biased estimates. Bad and              
malicious actors tend to disappear and reappear quickly in different forms (new accounts,             
domains, pages, etc) ​(Bastos & Mercea, 2018)​. For this reason, black lists risks to become               
quickly outdated as well. 
Beside using black-lists, malicious actors may also be automatically detected ​(Shu, Zhou,            
Wang, Zafarani, & Liu, 2019)​. This approach has been frequently used for bots – agents that,                
with a varying degree of automatization, communicate on social media. Features such as the              
account creation date, clearly recognizable account behavior patterns, the absence of           
customization such as profile image or covers are often weighed by algorithms aimed at              
automatically detecting such actors ​(Yang et al., 2019)​. Bots have been shown to play active               
roles in campaigns aimed at artificially boost the reach of certain content ​(Bessi & Ferrara,               
1 Training the algorithm with content flagged as false by professional fact-checker (supervised machine              
learning) sounds like a promising compromise. However, even computationally and financially resourceful            
companies such as Google, Facebook or Twitter are still experimenting with this approach when it comes to                 
misinformation. 
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2016; Howard, Woolley, & Calo, 2018)​. While offering better results than automatic means             
to identify false content, bot detection is also far from perfect ​(Morstatter, Wu, Nazer, Carley,               
& Liu, 2016)​. Sophisticated bots may be difficult and sometimes impossible to detect ​(Luceri,              
Deb, Giordano, & Ferrara, 2019)​. 
 
Media manipulation and false content 
To make things even more tricky, creating and distributing false content only represents the              
tip of the iceberg of the strategies employed by malicious actors to manipulate social media,               
mainstream media and the public debate ​(Marwick & Lewis, 2017)​. Sometimes, even a             
suitably titled legitimate news stories, opportunely and artificially amplified, can be           
weaponized to skew the public narrative around certain issues. Both false and real content              
benefit from a multitude of actors that amplify (intentionally or not) its reach. Depending on               
the popularity of each actor in the network and the budget they can invest in social media ads,                  
the magnitude of this amplification may change drastically. Furthermore, popular content           
tends to spread faster on social media due to the effect of algorithms that prioritize               
better-performing links, images, videos, and posts. These performances depend on an           
estimate of popularity based on the analysis of quantified attention metrics provided by each              
platform (likes, reactions, retweets, views, shares, etc). Beside the effect of this “rich will get               
richer” feedback loop, popular social media content and highly discussed topics are often             
featured in traditional media, thus benefiting from a significant further spin. The centrality of              
these metrics offers big rewards to those interested in increasing the visibility of certain              
content ​(Y. Zhang, Wells, Wang, & Rohe, 2017)​. For these reasons, different actors may              
attempt to coordinate their efforts to get the initial spin which, once detected by the               
algorithm, may ignite the propagation machine and even attract the attention of mainstream             
8 
Running head: It Takes a Village to Manipulate the Media 
media ​(Phillips, 2018)​. This is not at all a new phenomenon. Fans’ attempts to coordinate               
their behavior to push certain hashtags into Twitter trending topics date back to 2011 at least                
(boyd, 2017)​. During the last few years, we observed similar practices applied with the aim of                
enhancing the spread of political news stories. The practice of ​hacking the attention economy              
can be driven by a range of motivations from ideology to commercial, to gain status or                
attention or simply for fun ​(Marwick & Lewis, 2017; J. Zhang, Carpenter, & Ko, 2013)​. 
Similar campaigns can be identified by looking at the veracity of content or actors              
involved. For this reason, in this paper we argue for a broader ecological approach that               
primarily takes into account the collective behavior of malicious actors. While it is in fact               
perfectly possible that problematic content are published and distributed without any form of             
attempts of amplifying its reach, it is highly probable that the spread of harmful content are                
supported by these operations. Detecting the coordinated attempts of multiple actors to            
increase the visibility of certain content may thus lead to identify networks of potentially              
inauthentic actors aimed at amplify problematic content. Following a terminology introduced           
by Facebook, we describe this type of operations as “Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior”.            
“Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior” have been defined in a brief two-minutes explanatory           
video by Nathaniel Gleicher, Head of Cybersecurity Policy of Facebook as a case when              
“groups of pages or people work together to mislead others about who they are or what they                 
are doing” ​(Gleicher, 2018)​. By shifting the attention to deceptive behaviors, the definition             
deliberately avoids to fall in the trap of judging the truthfulness of content: “The posts               
themselves may not be false”. In the same video, Gleicher also provides an example: “We               
may take a network down for making it look like it’s being run from one part of the world                   
when in fact it’s being run from another. This could be done for ideological purposes or can                 
be financially motivated.” Beside the operations undertaken by foreign or local governments,            
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the policy also applies to “non-state actors, domestic groups and commercial companies”            
(Gleicher, 2019)​. 
In other terms, the definition comprises of coordination and inauthenticity. Both           
concepts have been widely studied, albeit rarely in conjunction. In the next paragraphs, we              
summarize these studies with the aim of grounding the definition of coordinated inauthentic             
behavior in the existing literature. 
Coordination 
Coordination can be defined as the act of making people and/or things involved in an               
organized cooperation. Several authors argued that it is a distinctive mark of users’             
participation within online spaces ​(Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013; Jenkins, 2006;           
Rotman et al., 2011; Shirky, 2008)​. Such coordination plays a key role in the online               
participatory culture described by Henry Jenkins in “Convergence Culture” ​(2008)​. Online           
fandom, for instance, proved to be capable to organize collective actions with different             
purposes, as inflate social media attention metrics (likes, retweets, etc.) on a specific topic or               
to influence the plot of a narrative or the trade of an item.  
Online activism benefited from the opportunity of building online communities and           
coordinating their collective actions allowed by the Internet ​(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012)​.            
While most of the early accounts and scholarly work focuses on the beneficial outcomes of               
digital mediated forms of collaboration as they empower protest movements to fight            
established and sometimes oppressive powers ​(Coleman, 2015; Freelon, McIlwain, & Clark,           
2018; Loader & Mercea, 2011)​, the same infrastructure and organization techniques can be             
employed by a range of diversely motivated malicious actors ​(Jenkins, Ito, & boyd, 2015;              
Marwick & Lewis, 2017)​. 
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Authenticity 
While authenticity has become an increasingly relevant topic for social media companies            
(Salisbury & Pooley, 2017)​, malicious actors used whatever websites and social media            
opportunity to propagate ideas while hiding their real identities and intentions ​(Bastos &             
Farkas, 2019; Daniels, 2009; Donovan & Friedberg, 2019)​. Several scholars provided a range             
of examples of these activities, from anti-abortion sites masked under the pro-choice tag             
(Daniels, 2014) to false Islamist Facebook pages spreading anti-muslims content ​(Farkas,           
Schou, & Neumayer, 2018)​. 
Besides such “cloaked websites”, a well-known type of inauthentic online behavior is            
that of bots and fake accounts, key tool for spreading computational propaganda ​(Woolley &              
Howard, 2016)​. Bots are widely exploited to manipulate online political discussion and boost             
politicians’ followers to generate false impressions of popularity ​(Bastos & Mercea, 2017;            
Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Flammini, & Menczer, 2011; Woolley &             
Howard, 2016)​. Paid users are also employed to impersonate fake social media accounts to              
undermine online public discourse and distract the public from controversial issues ​(King,            
Pan, & Roberts, 2017)​.  
In the seminal work “The people’s choice”, Lazarsfeld and colleagues ​(1944)           
inquieried the role played by personal influence (exposure to casual conversations about            
politics as opposed to the role played by mass media) on the formation of political opinions,                
finding that personal influence, compared with traditional media, is able to reach more             
frequently undecided voters and catch the audience less prepared against influence. Given the             
effect of accidental exposure to political content on social media on online participation             
(Valeriani & Vaccari, 2016)​, malicious social media entities aimed at influencing political            
opinion may have strong incentive to do so without revealing their authentic motivation and              
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identity. Furthermore, exploiting the Internet opportunity to gather together people based on            
personal interests ​(Ito et al., 2010)​, it is much easier to build a large follower base by                 
presenting, in order to appeal to a wider audience, the entity as dedicated to entertainment or                
popular culture than politics. Once the follower base is established, the pages and groups can               
be used to convey political content to a largely unguarded audience. 
 
Research Questions 
Despite the approach focused on coordination and authenticity suits existing literature and is             
currently employed by major social media companies as a policy to fight information             
operations that seek to manipulate public debate and, in turn, remove network of actors              
(accounts, pages and groups) behind such operations, there is a shortage of scholarly             
evidence on the effectiveness of this approach in terms of surfacing malicious actors and              
problematic information. To address this gap, we put the idea to test it by analyzing Facebook                
shares of political news stories published in the run up of two Italian elections. Using an                
original method described in the next section, we detected several networks of coordinated             
and inauthentic actors that cooperated to boost certain political news stories in the lead up of                
both 2018 and 2019 elections. We thus formulated the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: Did these coordinated networks share problematic content in the months           
preceding 2018 and 2019 Italian elections? 
 
The evidence available in the literature clearly describe a range of motivations pushing actors              
to coordinate their activities to artificially boost the popularity of certain online content.             
Given this different range of motivations, we expect that networks entirely composed by             
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openly political entities (pages, groups and verified profiles belonging to political actors            
and/or presenting themselves as a venue to get information and discuss politics) and networks              
also composed, instead, by inauthentic entities that shared political contents under a            
misleading non political identity, would differ in terms of typology of content shared and              
structure of the network. We thus formulated the following research questions: 
 
RQ2a: Did political and non-political coordinated networks employ different link          
sharing strategies? 
 
Considering that existing research on online coordinated information spreading ​(Del Vicario           
et al., 2016) have suggested that specific network configurations might be more effective, and              
thus preferable to achieve a broader dissemination of content, we finally settled on analysing              
the structure of the coordinated networks. Based on these studies it was asked: 
 
RQ2b: Are there significant structural differences between political and non-political          
coordinated networks? 
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Data and Methods 
The analyses presented in this paper are based on two datasets of online Italian political news                
stories shared on Facebook during the six months preceding the 2018 Italian general election              
(​N = 84,815) and the 2019 European election (​N ​= 164,760). For both the elections, news                
items were collected in real-time using a technological infrastructure based on the            
open-source software Huginn from three sources: Google News, the Global Database of            2
Society (GDELT) and Twitter (filtering for tweets including a link and mention of a              
candidate or a political party).  
CrowdTangle API link endpoint ​(CrowdTangle Team, 2019) was used to collect public            
Facebook/Instagram shares of the news stories URLs in our datasets performed in a period of               
seven days after the publication of each piece of news. CrowdTangle is a social media               
analytics tool owned by Facebook that tracks most of the public posts on Facebook,              
Instagram and Reddit. The numbers shown by this tool reflect public interactions (likes,             
reactions, comments, shares, upvotes and three second views), with the exception of reach,             
referral traffic and data around posts originally created as paid ads or made visible only to                
specific groups of followers . The resulting datasets consisted of 107,842 shares performed            3
by 6,217 unique entities (2018 election dataset) and 222,877 shares performed by 8,148             
unique entities (2019 election dataset). 
The detection of the networks of coordinated entities was designed as a two steps              
process (Fig 1). First, the algorithm estimates a time threshold for identifying all the news               4
items shared near simultaneously by different entities in a short period of time. Subsequently,              
2 Huginn is “a system for building agents that perform automated tasks”: ​https://github.com/huginn/huginn​. 
3 Please see ​https://help.crowdtangle.com/en/articles/1140930-what-is-crowdtangle-tracking for an overview of        
what CrowdTangle is tracking. For this study only Facebook and Instagram platforms have been used. 
4 The algorithm is developed in R and the code is available at             
https://github.com/fabiogiglietto/coord_link_share_ct​. 
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the coordinated networks are identified by grouping just the entities that repeatedly shared the              
same news story near simultaneously. 
INSERT FIG 1 HERE 
While it is ordinary that several entities share the same URLs, the rationale of the               
method is that it is unlikely that this occurs within a very short time span and repeatedly.                 
Such rapidity and regularity in sharing news items can be a signal of coordinated activity.  
The idea is thus to operationalize, as a first step, the concept of “near-simultaneous              
sharing” by finding an appropriate time threshold. Given a CrowdTangle dataset of URLs             
shares, this threshold is estimated by analyzing the time differences between each share of the               
same URL ranked by date (i.e. the date-time when the links were shared) to identify a subset                 
consisting of 10% URLs with the shortest time span between the first and second share, based                
on the assumption that quickness is necessary for online actors to occupy the social media               
space. We then identified the desired threshold by calculating the median time in seconds              
used by 10% of the quickest URLs to reach 50% of their total number of shares, assuming                 
that networks aimed at spreading news items are likely to be closely associated to the news                
sources they spread. We used this threshold to identify a list of entities that performed               
“near-simultaneous link sharing”. 
Since a regular pattern of activity is a significant signal of the existence of an organized                
structure aimed at spreading news articles on social media, as a second step, we derived from                
the list of entities resulting from the previous step the networks of the entities that frequently                
(above the 90th percentile or more than 4 times for 2018 and more than 3 times for 2019)                  
shared news links in a coordinated way.  
By using this method, a total of 24 and 92 strongly coordinated networks which spread               
political news before the 2018 and 2019 elections, respectively, were identified. The 2018             
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networks were composed by 82 entities, while the 2019 networks by 606 entities. Given the               
conservative approach used in estimating the “near-simultaneous shares” threshold, the          
entities listed should be considered as the core of potentially larger networks. 
The analyses focused on the news stories shared by these highly coordinated networks             
within a very short time from each other, that is 2,213 news items shared in the 2018 election                  
dataset, and 5,863 in the 2019 election dataset, also comparing them with the news items               
shared by the non coordinated entities in both years, which were 38,233 in the 2018 dataset                
and 66,810 in the 2019 dataset. There is a small overlap in the news items shared by                 
coordinated and non coordinated entities: in the 2018 election dataset about 3% of all the               
news items shared by non coordinated pages and groups were shared also by coordinated              
ones, while in the 2019 election dataset the overlap amounts to about 6%. 
INSERT TAB 1 HERE 
To answer the first research question about whether the coordinated networks identified            
through the method described above actually spread problematic content online, we checked            
the domains they shared against blacklists of already identified sources of “fake” and             
hyperpartisan news. The list of Italian problematic websites was retrieved from established            
debunking websites which were already used for the same purpose before. Merging the             
blacklists published by these websites we ended up with a list of 332 problematic news               
domains. Moreover, we checked the coordinated entities against a list of 87 Facebook pages              
already pointed out as sources of problematic information by the nonprofit organization            
Avaaz ​(Di Benedetto Montaccini, 2019; Mastinu, 2019)​.  
To answer the second research question concerning the differences in terms of link             
sharing strategies, the analysis focused on the degree of politicalness of the coordinated             
networks and the variety of sources they shared. First, it was performed a qualitative analysis               
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of the profiles and cover photos of the coordinated entities, so as to understand their               
self-presentation strategy and classify them as “political”, when their politicalness was           
explicit, or “non-political”, when their self-presentation did not include any reference to            
politics. Then, a measure of politicalness ranging from 0 to 1 was computed for each network                
based on the proportion of openly political entities over the total entities of a network.               
Afterward, it was measured how much large or narrow was the set of domains shared by each                 
coordinated network. To this end, it was computed the Gini coefficient on the proportions of               
unique domains they shared. Since the Gini coefficient is not computable on only one value,               
the networks that shared only a single domain were assigned value 1. 
Considered the skewness of the data, the statistical analyses were based on            
non-parametric techniques, such as Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to calculate          
correlations. The chi-square test was used to evaluate statistical relations between categorical            
variables and the odds ratio to measure the strength of these relations. The analyses were               
performed with R ​(R Core Team, 2013)​. 
To answer the third research question on the structure of the coordinated networks, the              
analysis of the pages performing coordinated sharing activity was focused on examining            
strongly coordinated networks to investigate if the political nature of the networks            
(politicalness) or their editorial strategy, measured through the Gini coefficient, are more            
frequently associated with a specific type of structure. We looked at network structures             
through two specific metrics: degree centralization and clustering coefficient. Degree          
centralization is a widely used metric of degree distribution concentration ​(Butts, 2006;            
Wasserman & Faust, 1994) and it has been observed as a measure for authoritarian structures               
where the opinion of a central node is imposed to, and shared with, external satellites ​(Sicilia,                
Korfiatis, Poulos, & Bokos, 2006)​. We used the value of degree centralization to measure              
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how much the observed co-sharing network was structured like a star-like network with a              
clear center of origin. Clustering coefficient ​(Watts & Strogatz, 1998) measures the degree to              
which nodes in a network tend to cluster together forming triangles and it has been often                
associated with the presence of strong community structures ​(Girvan & Newman, 2002;            
Rossi & Giglietto, 2016)​. We used clustering coefficient to measure how the observed             
networks were densely connected communities. 
Given the nature of the chosen metrics, the analysis could only be performed on              
networks counting more than two entities. This meant that we removed 73 networks that were               
composed of only two nodes. Figure 2 shows the density functions of the size of the networks                 
showing how dyads of only two nodes were, by far, the most common size. 
INSERT FIG 2 HERE 
 
Findings 
Statistical significant relations emerged between coordinated activity and the problematicity          
of both the domains and the Facebook entities (pages or groups) that shared their stories. 
In the 2018 election dataset, news items shared in a coordinated way were published by               
problematic domains significantly more frequently (39%) than those shared without          
coordinated activity (5%), (1, ​N = 107,842) = 12,529, ​p < 0.001, odds ratio 12.07 (95% CI   χ2                
[11.46, 12.72]). The same, although weaker, relation emerged before the 2019 elections,            
when the news articles shared in a coordinated way were published by problematic news              
sources slightly more frequently (4.87%) than those shared without coordination (4.53%),           χ2  
(1,​ N​ = 222,877) = 10.879, ​p​ < 0.001, odds ratio 1.08 (95% CI [1.03, 1.13]). 
We also observed a strong relation between coordinated activities and well-known           
problematic Facebook pages and groups. Checking the list of coordinated and           
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non-coordinated entities against the Avaaz list of Italian problematic Facebook pages, it            
emerged that both in 2018 and 2019 the entities we detected as coordinated were significantly               
more present than the non coordinated entities. The 2018 coordinated pages and groups             
occurred in the list of signaled Facebook pages much more frequently (11%) than the non               
coordinated ones (1%), (1, N = 6,217) = 110.3, ​p ​< 0.001. Computing the odds ratio it   χ2                
emerged that coordinated entities were 21.49 times (95% CI [9.97, 46.32]) more likely to be               
signaled than the non coordinated entities. The same relation emerged in the 2019 election              
dataset, where the number of coordinated entities included in the list of problematic pages              
was larger (6.8%) than that of the non coordinated ones (0.3%), (1, N = 8,148) = 298.05,           χ2        
p < 0.001. In the 2019 case the coordinated entities were 24.8 times (95% CI [14.67, 41.93])                 
more likely to be mentioned in the list of problematic Facebook pages and groups than the                
non coordinated ones. 
Based on the abovementioned evidence it was concluded that coordinated entities           
shared problematic information before the 2018 and 2019 elections in Italy. Also the answer              
to the second research question about whether political and non political coordinated            
networks employ different link sharing strategies was affirmative.  
As expected, the qualitative inspection of the entities facade pinpointed a certain degree             
of deception. Although all of the pages in the datasets shared political news stories, some of                
them did not disclose their political nature but, on the contrary, conceal it under the               
appearance of venues exclusively devoted to entertainment, soft news stories or gossip.            
Considering the coordinated networks active before the 2018 election, 27% of the            
coordinated networks presented themselves as non political, 29% were composed by openly            
political and non political entities, and 44% were explicitly political in nature. Examining the              
coordinated networks active before the 2019 elections, it analogously emerged that 19%            
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presented themselves as non political, 64% were composed by explicitly political and non             
political entities, and 17% were composed by plainly political entities. 
Besides the issue of deception, the percentage of political entities in a network was also               
associated with different strategies in terms of the variety of news domains a coordinated              
network shared. Considering the coordinated networks that spread news items before both the             
2018 and 2019 elections in Italy, a strong relation emerged between politicalness of a              
network and the domains sharing strategies. Indeed, a Spearman correlation found that the             
more explicital the politicalness of a network, the lower the shares concentration around a              
few domains, both in the 2018 election dataset, = -.76, ​N = 24, ​p < 0.001, and in the 2019        rs             
election dataset, = -.63 , ​N​ = 92, ​p​ < 0.001.rs  
The analysis of the network structures associated with the coordinated networks           
revealed a tendency of the networks to assume either one or the other of the two ideal                 
configurations we have identified: highly clustered or highly centralized networks. Figure 3            
represents the density functions of the two metrics measured on the networks and shows how               
the networks seem to be either organized in one way or another, thus clustering into two                
groups: one dominated by a centralized structure and one dominated by a clustered structure.              
Obviously a network can not have both high clustering coefficient and high degree             
centralization, but a majority of values either on a single side or in the middle ground was                 
entirely possible and it has not been observed.  
INSERT FIG. 3 HERE 
Figure 4 shows strongly coordinated networks detected in 2018 and 2019 plotted            
according to their values of centralization and clustering coefficient. It can be observed that              
networks present various types of structures with the tendency for the networks to assume              
either one of the two “ideal” structures (highly clustered or highly centralized). 
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INSERT FIG 4 HERE 
We have then explored if there were a correlation between the two structures we              
identified and specific level of politicalness or editorial strategy (measured through the Gini             
coefficient), without finding any significant relation. Figure 5 shows the level of politicalness             
and the Gini coefficient for each strongly coordinated network plotting according to their             
clustering coefficient and level of centralization. Inspecting Figure 5, emerged that there was             
no relation between the structure of the strongly coordinated networks and their politicalness             
or their Gini index. We observed networks dominated by political pages both with a highly               
centralized structure and highly clustered structure. Similarly, we found highly centralized           
pages with extremely high Gini index and as well as highly clustered pages. Thus, the               
observed dichotomy of adopted structure is a finding that requires future works to be fully               
explained. 
INSERT FIG. 5 HERE 
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Limitations 
The algorithm used to detect the “coordinated link sharing behaviour” proved useful to             
surface subsets with highest concentration of problematic content and actors across the two             
different datasets of CrowdTangle shares. However, additional tests are needed on a wider             
range of different datasets of fine tune the algorithm. At the same time, while we tried to                 
carefully avoid arbitrary choices when setting time and edges filters by linking these             
thresholds to the distributions, a certain amount of arbitrariness proved to be unavoidable. 
Entities removed by Facebook as the results of a violation of their policies, disappear from               
CrowdTangle as well. Given the focus on the analysis of potentially malicious actors, we can               
not exclude the presence of additional entities or entire coordinated networks at work during              
both 2018 and 2019 elections. Under this perspective, a public database of the removed              
entities and the URLs they shared, similar to the one maintained by Twitter ​(2019)​, would be                
helpful for future studies. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Given the widely recognized risks posed to democracy by information operations aimed at             
manipulating the public debate through social media, a wide range of studies attempted to              
define the phenomenon, estimate its prevalence and effects. However, the complexity of the             
challenge and the wide variety of motivations and strategies adopted by different malicious             
actors undermined the attempts to establish a sufficiently shared terminology required to            
build reliable measures of prevalence and impact. Given this lack of common ground, both              
content-based and actor-based approaches seem unable to provide compelling answers to the            
challenges at stake. 
In this paper, we introduce an additional approach that focuses on the collective behaviour              
of the actors. The contribution is twofold. On the one hand, we frame the concept of                
22 
Running head: It Takes a Village to Manipulate the Media 
“coordinated inauthentic behaviour” in the existing literature on coordination and          
authenticity. On the other, we assess the reliability of the approach by detecting and              
analyzing networks of coordinated Facebook entities that boosted political news stories in the             
lead up of 2018 and 2019 Italian elections. 
By analysing over three hundred thousand Facebook shares of thousands political news             
stories, we identified hundreds of networks of coordinated entities that cooperated to boost a              
wide variety of sources under a wide variety of political and non political identities. 
Entities feeding political content to their subscribers while hiding their identity and            
intention are particularly distressing. While the scholarly debate about the role played by             
social media in fostering more selective or cross-cutting exposure flourished, our           
understanding of the prevalence and effect of this form of casual exposure requires more              
work (especially concerning cases where this ​casual exposure is in fact orchestrated by             
malicious actors). 
Both the news outlets shared and Facebook coordinated entities detected tend to appear             
with a frequency well above other news outlets and entities in black-lists compiled by Italian               
fact-checkers. Furthermore, we show that networks predominantly composed by political          
entities tend to share a wider variety of news outlets than networks including entities with               
deceptive non political identities. Certain networks only share one specific domain and this             
domain is often problematic. In other terms, while political networks tend to share news              
stories from different sources as long as they support their worldview and even sometimes to               
shame the alternative worldview, the entire existence of certain non political networks is             
devoted to boost specific news outlets. While the first group are ideologically motivated, the              
second are mainly commercially motivated.  
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Thanks to the comparative perspective offered by two subsequent elections, we also            
observed several differences that may depend on changes in the strategies adopted by these              
networks or being the effect of the new policies enforced by Facebook before the EU               
Parliamentarian 2019 election ​(Woodford, 2019)​. The ever changing policies of social media            
platforms combined with the as much changing adversarial strategies conceived by malicious            
actors and their networks, pose serious challenges to those who intend to study this              
phenomenon. At the same time, while we used black-lists to assess the presence of previously               
known problematic outlets and entities, the comparison between 2018 and 2019 clearly points             
out that new outlets and entities keep substituting old one making static black-lists partially              
ineffective. 
The analysis of the structural properties of the strongly coordinated networks produced            
mixed results. On the one side, the structural properties that have been identified,             
centralization and level of clustering, appears to be relevant since the networks seems to              
assume one of the two configurations associated with those properties. Nevertheless, our            
attempt to explain the structures using as explanatory variable the level of politicalness or the               
Gini index of the networks resulted inconclusive leaving the explanation of the observed             
duality in structures as a goal for further research.  
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